Incentives and Managerial Experience in Multi-Task Teams: Evidence from within a Firm

Advanced Institute of Management Research Paper No. 068

45 Pages Posted: 1 Dec 2008

See all articles by Rachel Griffith

Rachel Griffith

Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS); University of Manchester; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Andy Neely

University of Cambridge; London Business School

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 1, 2008

Abstract

This paper exploits a quasi-experimental setting to estimate the impact that a multi-dimensional group incentive scheme had on branch performance in a large distribution firm. The scheme, which is based on the Balanced Scorecard, was implemented in all branches in one division, but not in another. Branches from the second division are used as a control group. Our results suggest that the balanced scorecard had some impact, but that it varied with branch characteristics, and in particular, branches with more experienced managers were better able to respond to the new incentives.

Suggested Citation

Griffith, Rachel and Neely, Andy D., Incentives and Managerial Experience in Multi-Task Teams: Evidence from within a Firm (August 1, 2008). Advanced Institute of Management Research Paper No. 068. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1309642 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1309642

Rachel Griffith (Contact Author)

Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) ( email )

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+44 20 7291 4800 (Phone)
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University of Manchester ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.ifs.org.uk/people/profile?id=37

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Andy D. Neely

University of Cambridge ( email )

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Cambridge, CB2 1TN
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.ifm.eng.cam.ac.uk/people/adn1000/

London Business School ( email )

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United Kingdom

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