Information Acquisition During a Descending Auction

28 Pages Posted: 18 Dec 2008

See all articles by Achim Wambach

Achim Wambach

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research; University of Mannheim; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Date Written: October 2008

Abstract

If bidders can acquire information during the auction the descending auction is no longer equivalent to a first-price-sealed-bid auction. Revenue equivalence does not hold. The incentive to acquire information can even be larger in a descending auction than in an ascending auction.

Keywords: Descending auction, Dutch auction, First price sealed bid auction, Information acquisition

JEL Classification: D44, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Wambach, Achim, Information Acquisition During a Descending Auction (October 2008). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7023, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1311147

Achim Wambach (Contact Author)

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

University of Mannheim ( email )

Universitaetsbibliothek Mannheim
Zeitschriftenabteilung
Mannheim, 68131
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

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