Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL ECONOMICS, Vol. 1A, pp. 781-852, Alberto Bisin, Jess Benhabib, and Matthew Jackson, eds., North-Holland, 2011
90 Pages Posted: 7 Dec 2008 Last revised: 10 Jun 2011
Date Written: December 14, 2009
Abstract
A survey of the literature on matching market design regarding house allocation, kidney exchange, and school choice problems.
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