The Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good and the Montreal Protocol: Behavioral and Data Concerns

Posted: 10 Dec 2008

See all articles by James Murdoch

James Murdoch

University of Texas at Dallas - School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences

Todd M. Sandler

University of Texas at Dallas - School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences, Department of Economics & Finance

Abstract

This article argues that the World Resources Institute (WRI) data are appropriate for our game-theoretic-based analysis of countries CFC emission cutbacks prior to the ratification of the Protocol. Given the underlying game from which our reduced-form equations follow, the policymakers must be viewed as responding to contemporary information, which was the WRI dataset. The article also addresses the issue of an alleged perfect correlation being induced between CFC emission cutbacks and GNP due to the imputation process used by WRI. The article also raises concerns about inventory inclusion in the United Nations Environmental Programme data that could distort cutbacks for major producer countries that were likely to stockpile CFCs before production lines were shifted over to CFC substitutes.

JEL Classification: H41, D62, Q20

Suggested Citation

Murdoch, James and Sandler, Todd M., The Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good and the Montreal Protocol: Behavioral and Data Concerns. Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 61, No. 1, pp. 197-200, 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1311716 or http://dx.doi.org/gpn022

James Murdoch

University of Texas at Dallas - School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences ( email )

P.O. Box 830688, GR 31
Richardson, TX 75083
United States

Todd M. Sandler

University of Texas at Dallas - School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences, Department of Economics & Finance ( email )

Richardson, TX 75083
United States

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