42 Pages Posted: 8 Dec 2008 Last revised: 16 Jun 2012
Date Written: April 17, 2010
In contrast to the widely held belief that targets capture the lion’s share of merger gains, I document considerable variation in the division of dollar gains in mergers and find that the gains to targets are only modestly more than the gains to acquirers. I present empirical evidence in support of a new hypothesis that argues that a firm’s relative scarcity (proxied by its market power) and product market dependence (proxied by customer-supplier relations) help to explain the firm’s share of the total merger gains. These results provide some of the first large-scale evidence on bargaining outcomes in mergers.
Keywords: Mergers and acquisitions, bargaining power, product market relationships
JEL Classification: G30, G34, C70
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Ahern, Kenneth R., Bargaining Power and Industry Dependence in Mergers (April 17, 2010). Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Vol. 103, No. 3, 2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1311922 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1311922