Interval Game Theoretic Division Rules

CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2008-97

19 Pages Posted: 10 Dec 2008  

Rodica Branzei

'A.l. Cuza' University of Iasi, Romania - Faculty of Computer Sciences

Marco Dall'Aglio

LUISS Guido Carli University

Stef H. Tijs

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research; Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research; Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

Date Written: November 7, 2008

Abstract

Interval bankruptcy problems arise in situations where an estate has to be liquidated among a fixed number of creditors and uncertainty about the amounts of the estate and the claims is modeled by intervals. We extend in the interval setting the classic results by Curiel, Maschler and Tijs (Bankruptcy games, Zeitschrift fuer Operations Research, 31 (1987), A 143 - A 159) that characterize division rules which are solutions of the cooperative bankruptcy game.

Keywords: cooperative games, interval data, bankruptcy problems

JEL Classification: C71

Suggested Citation

Branzei, Rodica and Dall'Aglio, Marco and Tijs, Stef H., Interval Game Theoretic Division Rules (November 7, 2008). CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2008-97. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1313613 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1313613

Rodica Branzei (Contact Author)

'A.l. Cuza' University of Iasi, Romania - Faculty of Computer Sciences ( email )

Carol I Blvd, Nr.11
Lasi
Romania

Marco Dall'Aglio

LUISS Guido Carli University

Via O. Tommasini 1
Rome, Roma 00100
Italy

Stef H. Tijs

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
B925
5000 LE Tilburg
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2348 (Phone)

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research ( email )

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

Via Dodecaneso 35
16146 Genoa
Italy

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