Monotonicity Properties of Interval Solutions and the Dutta-Ray Solution for Convex Interval Games

CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2008-102

17 Pages Posted: 11 Dec 2008

See all articles by Elena Yanovskaya

Elena Yanovskaya

Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) - Saint Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathmatics; National Research University Higher School of Economics

Rodica Branzei

'A.l. Cuza' University of Iasi, Romania - Faculty of Computer Sciences

Stef H. Tijs

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research; Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research; Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

Date Written: December 5, 2008

Abstract

This paper examines several monotonicity properties of value-type interval solutions on the class of convex interval games and focuses on the Dutta-Ray (DR) solution for such games. Well known properties for the classical DR solution are extended to the interval setting. In particular, it is proved that the interval DR solution of a convex interval game belongs to the interval core of that game and Lorenz dominates each other interval core element. Consistency properties of the interval DR solution in the sense of Davis-Maschler and of Hart-Mas-Colell are verified. An axiomatic characterization of the interval DR solution on the class of convex interval games with the help of bilateral Hart-Mas-Colell consistency and the constrained egalitarianism for two-person interval games is given.

Keywords: cooperative interval games, convex games, the constrained egalitarian solution, the equal division core, consistency

JEL Classification: C71

Suggested Citation

Yanovskaya, Elena and Branzei, Rodica and Tijs, Stef H., Monotonicity Properties of Interval Solutions and the Dutta-Ray Solution for Convex Interval Games (December 5, 2008). CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2008-102, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1313724 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1313724

Elena Yanovskaya (Contact Author)

Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) - Saint Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathmatics ( email )

Tchaikovsky st. 1
Saint Petersburg, 191187
Russia

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

Rodica Branzei

'A.l. Cuza' University of Iasi, Romania - Faculty of Computer Sciences ( email )

Carol I Blvd, Nr.11
Iasi
Romania

Stef H. Tijs

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
B925
5000 LE Tilburg
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2348 (Phone)

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research ( email )

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

Via Dodecaneso 35
16146 Genoa
Italy

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