Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act

Moser, Petra; Voena, Alessandra

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1313867

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Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act

45 Pages Posted: 25 Jun 2009 Last revised: 31 Jul 2010

See all articles by Petra Moser

Petra Moser

NYU Stern Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Alessandra Voena

Stanford University

There are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 12, 2009

Abstract

Compulsory licensing allows firms in developing countries to produce foreign-owned inventions without the consent of foreign patent owners. This paper uses an exogenous event of compulsory licensing after World War I under the Trading with the Enemy Act to examine the effects of compulsory licensing on domestic invention. Difference-in-differences analyses of nearly 200,000 chemical inventions suggest that compulsory licensing increased domestic invention by at least 20 percent.

Keywords: Compulsory licensing, licensing, patent law, innovation, invention, TRIPS

JEL Classification: O3, O34, O12, N00, N42, I10, I18, K33

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Moser, Petra and Voena, Alessandra, Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act (December 12, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1313867 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1313867