13 Pages Posted: 10 Dec 2008
Date Written: 2008
Under ex ante access regulation entrants often claim that access fees are excessive. I show that this is only the case if further entry is admitted. If the entrant is protected from further entry it would agree with the incumbent upon a strictly positive access fee which may exceed the efficient level. Ex post regulation facilitates this type of collusion and should be abandoned.
Keywords: entry deterrence, access regulation, network infrastructure, vertical differentiation
JEL Classification: K21, K23, L42, L51
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Beschorner, Patrick, Ex Post Regulation Facilitates Collusion (2008). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 08-099. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1314230 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1314230