Independent Auditors as Fiscal Gatekeepers

Luigi A. Franzoni

University of Bologna - School of Economics, Management, and Statistics

International Review of Law and Economics

This paper analyses the implications of mandatory attestation of tax returns. Attestations are provided by independent auditors competing on price. The paper identifies the conditions under which gatekeeping is socially desirable.

In the most general set-up, in which the detection of erroneous attestations depends on the effort exerted by the Revenue Service, gatekeeping proves to improve social welfare when: 1) the private audit cost is low; 2) the share of liability placed on the auditor is large; 3) the tax placed on liable taxpayers is high; and 4) the incentives for the Revenue Service to carry out investigations are otherwise low.

Note: This is a description of the paper and not the actual abstract.

JEL Classification: H29, M49

Not Available For Download

Date posted: November 12, 1998  

Suggested Citation

Franzoni, Luigi A., Independent Auditors as Fiscal Gatekeepers. International Review of Law and Economics. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=131461

Contact Information

Luigi Alberto Franzoni (Contact Author)
University of Bologna - School of Economics, Management, and Statistics ( email )
Piazza Scaravilli 2
40126 Bologna
IT-051-2098488 (Phone)
IT-051-221968 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.unibo.it/docenti/luigi.franzoni
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 631