Audited Reputation

9 Pages Posted: 23 Jan 2009 Last revised: 12 May 2009

See all articles by Hong Xu

Hong Xu

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Information, Risk, and Operations Management

Jianqing Chen

The University of Texas at Dallas, Jindal School of Management

Andrew B. Whinston

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Information, Risk and Operations Management

Date Written: December 12, 2008

Abstract

We study reputations with imperfect audit and a reputation market. The main result shows the existence of a separating equilibrium in the reputation market, which contrasts with Tadelis [Tadelis, S., 2002, The market for reputations as an incentive mechanism, Journal of Political Economy 110(4), 854-882].

Keywords: Reputation, Audit, Infinitely repeated game

JEL Classification: D40, D86, M20, M42

Suggested Citation

Xu, Hong and Chen, Jianqing and Whinston, Andrew B., Audited Reputation (December 12, 2008). Economics Letters, No. 100, pp. 359-362, 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1315336

Hong Xu (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Information, Risk, and Operations Management ( email )

2317 Speedway
Austin, TX 78712
United States

Jianqing Chen

The University of Texas at Dallas, Jindal School of Management ( email )

800 West Campbell Road
Richardson, TX 75080
United States

Andrew B. Whinston

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Information, Risk and Operations Management ( email )

CBA 5.202
Austin, TX 78712
United States
512-471-8879 (Phone)

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