Download This PaperAudited Reputation
9 Pages Posted: 23 Jan 2009 Last revised: 12 May 2009
Date Written: December 12, 2008
Abstract
We study reputations with imperfect audit and a reputation market. The main result shows the existence of a separating equilibrium in the reputation market, which contrasts with Tadelis [Tadelis, S., 2002, The market for reputations as an incentive mechanism, Journal of Political Economy 110(4), 854-882].
Keywords: Reputation, Audit, Infinitely repeated game
JEL Classification: D40, D86, M20, M42
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Xu, Hong and Chen, Jianqing and Whinston, Andrew B., Audited Reputation (December 12, 2008). Economics Letters, No. 100, pp. 359-362, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1315336
Hong Xu (Contact Author)
University of Texas at Austin - Department of Information, Risk, and Operations Management ( email )
2317 Speedway
Austin, TX Texas 78712
United States
Andrew B. Whinston
University of Texas at Austin - Department of Information, Risk and Operations Management ( email )
CBA 5.202
Austin, TX 78712
United States
512-471-8879 (Phone)
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