Unobserved Actions of Mutual Funds

Posted: 15 Dec 2008

See all articles by Marcin T. Kacperczyk

Marcin T. Kacperczyk

Imperial College London - Accounting, Finance, and Macroeconomics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Clemens Sialm

University of Texas at Austin - McCombs School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Lu Zheng

University of California, Irvine - Paul Merage School of Business

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 2008

Abstract

Despite extensive disclosure requirements, mutual fund investors do not observe all actions of fund managers. We estimate the impact of unobserved actions on fund returns using the return gap-the difference between the reported fund return and the return on a portfolio that invests in the previously disclosed fund holdings. We document that unobserved actions of some funds persistently create value, while such actions of other funds destroy value. Our main result shows that the return gap predicts fund performance.

Keywords: G11, G23

Suggested Citation

Kacperczyk, Marcin T. and Sialm, Clemens and Zheng, Lu, Unobserved Actions of Mutual Funds (November 2008). The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 21, Issue 6, pp. 2379-2416, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1315602 or http://dx.doi.org/hhl041

Marcin T. Kacperczyk (Contact Author)

Imperial College London - Accounting, Finance, and Macroeconomics ( email )

South Kensington campus
London SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Clemens Sialm

University of Texas at Austin - McCombs School of Business ( email )

Austin, TX 78712
United States

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.mccombs.utexas.edu/Clemens.Sialm/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Lu Zheng

University of California, Irvine - Paul Merage School of Business ( email )

Paul Merage School of Business
Irvine, CA California 92697-3125
United States
9498248365 (Phone)

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