The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism

Posted: 17 Dec 2008

See all articles by Alon Brav

Alon Brav

Duke University - Fuqua School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Wei Jiang

Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics; ECGI; NBER

Frank Partnoy

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law

Randall S. Thomas

Vanderbilt University - Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

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Abstract

Hedge fund activism is a new form of investment strategy. Using a large hand-collected dataset from 2001 to 2006, we find that activist hedge funds in the United States propose strategic, operational, and financial remedies and attain success or partial success in two-thirds of the cases. The abnormal stock return upon announcement of activism is approximately 7 percent, with no reversal during the subsequent year. Target firms experience increases in payout and operating performance and higher CEO turnover after activism. We find large positive abnormal return to hedge fund activists, which is higher than the return to other equity-oriented hedge funds.

Keywords: Alternative Investments - Hedge Fund Strategies, Portfolio Management - Hedge Fund Strategies, Corporate Governance

Suggested Citation

Brav, Alon and Jiang, Wei and Partnoy, Frank and Thomas, Randall S., The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism. Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 64, No. 6, 2008, San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 09-002, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1316408

Alon Brav (Contact Author)

Duke University - Fuqua School of Business ( email )

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Wei Jiang

Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics ( email )

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Frank Partnoy

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law ( email )

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Randall S. Thomas

Vanderbilt University - Law School ( email )

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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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