A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality

35 Pages Posted: 18 Dec 2008

See all articles by Olivier Jeanne

Olivier Jeanne

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department; Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussees (ENPC); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Jonathan D. Ostry

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Jeromin Zettelmeyer

Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics; CEPR

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2008

Abstract

We present a framework that clarifies the financial role of the IMF, the rationale for conditionality, and the conditions under which IMF-induced moral hazard can arise. In the model, traditional conditionality commits country authorities to undertake crisis resolution efforts, facilitating the return of private capital, and ensuring repayment to the IMF. Nonetheless, moral hazard can arise if there are crisis externalities across countries (contagion) or if country authorities discount crisis costs too much relative to the national social optimum, or both. Moral hazard can be avoided by making IMF lending conditional on crisis prevention efforts - "ex ante" conditionality.

Keywords: Financial crisis, Crisis prevention, Fund role, Conditionality, Moral hazard, Spillovers

Suggested Citation

Jeanne, Olivier and Ostry, Jonathan D. and Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality (October 2008). IMF Working Papers, Vol. , pp. 1-33, 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1316704

Olivier Jeanne (Contact Author)

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department ( email )

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Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussees (ENPC) ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Jonathan D. Ostry

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States

Jeromin Zettelmeyer

Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics ( email )

1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States

CEPR ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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