Suspending IP Obligations under TRIPS: A Viable Alternative to Enforce Prevailing WTO Rulings?

WTO Dispute Settlement Policy Paper - Centre for International Environmental Law, 2008

15 Pages Posted: 18 Dec 2008

See all articles by Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan

Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law; Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Date Written: May 4, 2008

Abstract

In two recent prominent disputes in the World Trade Organization (WTO), developing country complainants are using the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) to induce compliance with favorable WTO rulings. Brazil in the US - Cotton dispute and Antigua in the US - Gambling case announced their intention to "cross-retaliate" against WTO-inconsistent measures of the US by suspending obligations under the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). This approach can offer a practical alternative enforcement mechanism especially for developing countries and smaller economies in disputes against (industrialized) countries with significantly greater economic power in international trade. The concept has been explored in some academic writings and approved by WTO arbitrators in a recent US - Gambling decision and in response to Ecuador's retaliation request in the EC - Bananas III case. It is now time for a thorough and comprehensive analysis of the opportunities and problems surrounding intellectual property (IP) cross-retaliation.

Keywords: WTO, Dispute Settlement, TRIPS, Cross Retaliation, TRIPS Suspension

Suggested Citation

Grosse Ruse-Khan, Henning, Suspending IP Obligations under TRIPS: A Viable Alternative to Enforce Prevailing WTO Rulings? (May 4, 2008). WTO Dispute Settlement Policy Paper - Centre for International Environmental Law, 2008 . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1317304

Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan (Contact Author)

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law ( email )

10 West Road
Cambridge, CB3 9DZ
United Kingdom

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany

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