International Taxation and Multinational Firm Location Decisions

51 Pages Posted: 18 Dec 2008

See all articles by Salvador Barrios

Salvador Barrios

European Commission, JRC - IPTS

Harry Huizinga

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Luc Laeven

European Central Bank (ECB); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Gaëtan Nicodème

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management; CEPR and CESifo The views expressed in the article are those of the author and should not be attributed to the European Commission.

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Date Written: December 2008

Abstract

Using a large international firm-level data set, we estimate separate effects of host and parent country taxation on the location decisions of multinational firms. Both types of taxation are estimated to have a negative impact on the location of new foreign subsidiaries. In fact, the impact of parent country taxation is estimated to be relatively large, possibly reflecting its international discriminatory nature. For the cross-section of multinational firms, we find that parent firms tend to be located in countries with a relatively low taxation of foreign-source income. Overall, our results show that parent-country taxation - despite the general possibility of deferral of taxation until income repatriation - is instrumental in shaping the structure of multinational enterprise.

Keywords: corporate taxation, dividend withholding taxation, location decisions

JEL Classification: F23, G32, H25, R38

Suggested Citation

Barrios, Salvador and Huizinga, Harry and Laeven, Luc A. and Nicodeme, Gaetan, International Taxation and Multinational Firm Location Decisions (December 2008). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2503, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1317722

Salvador Barrios

European Commission, JRC - IPTS ( email )

Edificio Expo
C/ Inca Garcilaso s/n
Seville, 41092
Spain
34 954 48 82 08 (Phone)
34 954 48 82 08 (Fax)

Harry Huizinga (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2623 (Phone)
+31 13 466 3042 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Luc A. Laeven

European Central Bank (ECB) ( email )

Sonnemannstrasse 22
Frankfurt am Main, 60314
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Gaetan Nicodeme

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management ( email )

50 Avenue Roosevelt
Brussels 1050
Belgium

CEPR and CESifo The views expressed in the article are those of the author and should not be attributed to the European Commission.

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