The Future of Securities Regulation

50 Pages Posted: 23 Dec 2008 Last revised: 11 Feb 2009

See all articles by Luigi Zingales

Luigi Zingales

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

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Date Written: January 29, 2009

Abstract

The U.S. system of security law was designed more than 70 years ago to regain investors' trust after a major financial crisis. Today we face a similar problem. But while in the 1930s the prevailing perception was that investors had been defrauded by offerings of dubious quality securities, in the new millennium, investors' perception is that they have been defrauded by managers who are not accountable to anyone. For this reason, I propose a series of reforms that center around corporate governance, while shifting the focus from the protection of unsophisticated investors in the purchasing of new securities issues to the investment in mutual funds, pension funds, and other forms of asset management.

Keywords: U.S. Security Law, Securities Regulation, Trust

JEL Classification: G2, G28, G01

Suggested Citation

Zingales, Luigi, The Future of Securities Regulation (January 29, 2009). Chicago Booth School of Business Research Paper No. 08-27, FEEM Working Paper No. 7.2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1319648 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1319648

Luigi Zingales (Contact Author)

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