Work Incentives? Ex Post Effects of Unemployment Insurance Sanctions - Evidence from West Germany

34 Pages Posted: 23 Dec 2008  

Barbara Hofmann

Government of the Federal Republic of Germany - Institute for Employment Research (IAB)

Date Written: December 2008

Abstract

Unemployment insurance (UI) sanctions in the form of benefit reductions are intended to set disincentives for UI recipients to stay unemployed. Empirical evidence about the effects of UI sanctions in Germany is sparse. Using administrative data we investigate the effects of sanctions on the reemployment probability in West Germany for individuals who entered UI receipt between April 2000 and March 2001. By applying a matching approach that takes timing of events into account, we identify the ex post effect of UI sanctions. As a robustness check a difference-in-differences matching estimator is applied. The results indicate positive effects on the employment probability in regular employment for both women and men.

Keywords: unemployment insurance sanctions, dynamic matching

JEL Classification: J64, J65, J68

Suggested Citation

Hofmann, Barbara, Work Incentives? Ex Post Effects of Unemployment Insurance Sanctions - Evidence from West Germany (December 2008). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2508. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1319676

Barbara Hofmann (Contact Author)

Government of the Federal Republic of Germany - Institute for Employment Research (IAB) ( email )

Regensburger Str. 104
Nuremberg, 90478
Germany

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