Delegated Asset Management, Investment Mandates, and Capital Immobility
45 Pages Posted: 29 Dec 2008 Last revised: 22 Jan 2009
There are 2 versions of this paper
Delegated Asset Management, Investment Mandates, and Capital Immobility
Date Written: December 2008
Abstract
This paper develops a model to explain the widely used investment mandates in the institutional asset management industry based on two insights: First, giving a manager more investment flexibility weakens the link between fund performance and his effort in the designated market, and thus increases agency cost. Second, the presence of outside assets with negatively skewed returns can further increase the agency cost if the manager is incentivized to pursue outside opportunities. These effects motivate narrow mandates and tight tracking error constraints to most fund managers except those with exceptional talents. Our model sheds light on capital immobility and market segmentation that are widely observed in financial markets, and highlights important effects of negatively skewed risk on institutional incentive structures.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN
Recommended Papers
-
Illiquidity and Stock Returns: Cross-Section and Time-Series Effects
By Yakov Amihud
-
Illiquidity and Stock Returns: Cross-Section and Time-Series Effects
By Yakov Amihud
-
Liquidity Risk and Expected Stock Returns
By Lubos Pastor and Robert F. Stambaugh
-
Liquidity Risk and Expected Stock Returns
By Lubos Pastor and Robert F. Stambaugh
-
Liquidity Risk and Expected Stock Returns
By Lubos Pastor and Robert F. Stambaugh
-
Is Information Risk a Determinant of Asset Returns?
By David Easley, Soeren Hvidkjaer, ...
-
By Tarun Chordia, Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, ...
-
Common Factors in Prices, Order Flows and Liquidity
By Joel Hasbrouck and Duane J. Seppi
-
Common Factors in Prices, Order Flows and Liquidity
By Joel Hasbrouck and Duane J. Seppi
