Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-Management Agency Costs

14 Pages Posted: 4 Jan 2009 Last revised: 21 May 2013

Date Written: October 1, 2009

Abstract

Corporate governance scholarship has long focused on conflicts of interest between firms and their top executive officers. This essay contends that increasing leverage and financial complexity make it important for scholars to also focus on conflicts of interest between firms and their secondary managers.

Keywords: conflicts of interest, financial leverage, corporate governance

Suggested Citation

Schwarcz, Steven L., Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-Management Agency Costs (October 1, 2009). Yale Journal on Regulation, Vol. 26, No. 2, p. 459, 2009; Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Paper No. 230. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1322536

Steven L. Schwarcz (Contact Author)

Duke University School of Law ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States
919-613-7060 (Phone)
919-613-7231 (Fax)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
513
Abstract Views
2,652
rank
53,235
PlumX Metrics