Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-Management Agency Costs

Schwarcz, Steven L.

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Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-Management Agency Costs

Yale Journal on Regulation, Vol. 26, No. 2, p. 459, 2009

Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Paper No. 230

14 Pages Posted: 4 Jan 2009 Last revised: 21 May 2013

See all articles by Steven L. Schwarcz

Steven L. Schwarcz

Duke University School of Law

Date Written: October 1, 2009

Abstract

Corporate governance scholarship has long focused on conflicts of interest between firms and their top executive officers. This essay contends that increasing leverage and financial complexity make it important for scholars to also focus on conflicts of interest between firms and their secondary managers.

Keywords: conflicts of interest, financial leverage, corporate governance

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Schwarcz, Steven L., Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-Management Agency Costs (October 1, 2009). Yale Journal on Regulation, Vol. 26, No. 2, p. 459, 2009, Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Paper No. 230, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1322536