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Market Disciplining of the Developing Countries' Sovereign Governments

Contemporary Economic Policy, Forthcoming

39 Pages Posted: 12 Sep 2011  

Levent Bulut

Ipek University - Department of Economics; Ipek University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 19, 2010

Abstract

In this paper, we contribute to the current literature on market disciplining of the sovereign governments of the developing countries by distinguishing both sides of the market discipline hypothesis by adopting three-stage least square estimation to incorporate the contemporaneous feedback effects between primary structural budget balances and the country’s default risk premiums. We provide empirical evidence of a unidirectional causal relationship between a country’s default-risk premium and primary structural budget balances with the direction flowing from primary structural budget balances to country’s risk premium in 40 developing countries over the period 1975 to 2008. We also employ the Arrelano-Bond dynamic panel generalized methods of moments estimation to control for this joint determination of primary structural budget balances and the country’s default risk premium, and find supportive evidence of undisciplined sovereign governments and of non-linearly behaving well-functioning financial markets in the sample countries.

Keywords: Market Discipline Hypothesis, Structural Budget Balances, Country Default Risk Premium

JEL Classification: C5, G1, G3

Suggested Citation

Bulut, Levent, Market Disciplining of the Developing Countries' Sovereign Governments (October 19, 2010). Contemporary Economic Policy, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1323440

Levent Bulut (Contact Author)

Ipek University - Department of Economics ( email )

Ipek University
Turan Gunes Bulvari
Ankara, 06550
Turkey

Ipek University ( email )

Turan Güneş Blv
Ankara, 06550
Turkey

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