Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect

Employee Rights and Employment Policy Journal, Vol. 1, p. 189, 1997

32 Pages Posted: 8 Jan 2009 Last revised: 12 Jun 2011

See all articles by Lisa Blomgren Amsler (formerly Bingham)

Lisa Blomgren Amsler (formerly Bingham)

Indiana University Bloomington - School of Public & Environmental Affairs (SPEA); University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law

Date Written: January 1, 1997

Abstract

This study examines a 270-case sample of commercial and employment arbitration awards decided between 1993 and 1994, before the adoption of the Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising from Employment. It examines employee win rates and outcomes when employers are repeat players, defined as arbitrating in more than one case in the sample. Employers win statistically significantly more often when they are repeat players. Moreover, even when they win, employees recover statistically significantly less of their claims when they are arbitrating against repeat player employers. When they win against repeat player employers, employees recover only 11% of their claims. When they win in cases involving one-shot employers, they recover 48% of their claims. The study examines the implications of these findings regarding corporate and institutional repeat players for dispute resolution.

Keywords: employment, arbitration, repeat players

JEL Classification: D74, C70

Suggested Citation

Amsler, Lisa Blomgren, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect (January 1, 1997). Employee Rights and Employment Policy Journal, Vol. 1, p. 189, 1997. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1324411

Lisa Blomgren Amsler (Contact Author)

Indiana University Bloomington - School of Public & Environmental Affairs (SPEA) ( email )

1315 East Tenth Street
Rm. 333
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States

University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law ( email )

4505 South Maryland Parkway
Box 451003
Las Vegas, NV 89154
United States

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