Not Available for Download

When Do Fair Beliefs Influence Bargaining Behavior? Experimental Bargaining in Japan and the United States

Posted: 9 Jan 2009  

Nancy Buchan

University of Wisconsin - Madison - Department of Marketing

Rachel T. A. Croson

Michigan State University

Eric J. Johnson

Columbia Business School - Marketing

Date Written: June 2004

Abstract

In this research, we examine the influence of beliefs about fairness on bargaining behavior. Using a repeated ultimatum game, we examine bargaining contexts in Japan and the United States in which buyers' or sellers' fair beliefs are either in alignment with or in conflict with their own self-interest. We suggest that understanding the relationship between fair beliefs and self-interest is central to understanding when fair beliefs will influence bargaining behavior. Our results demonstrate that fair beliefs predict bargaining behavior when they are aligned with one's own self-interest.

Keywords: marketing research, consumer behavior, game theory, conflict management, supply & demand, negotiation, fairness, self-interest

Suggested Citation

Buchan, Nancy and Croson, Rachel T. A. and Johnson, Eric J., When Do Fair Beliefs Influence Bargaining Behavior? Experimental Bargaining in Japan and the United States (June 2004). Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 31, 2004. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1324764

Nancy Buchan

University of Wisconsin - Madison - Department of Marketing ( email )

975 University Avenue
Madison, WI 53706
United States

Rachel T. A. Croson

Michigan State University ( email )

East Lansing, MI 48824
United States

Eric J. Johnson (Contact Author)

Columbia Business School - Marketing ( email )

New York, NY 10027
United States

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
446