Independent Fiscal Agencies

38 Pages Posted: 17 Jan 2009

See all articles by Xavier Debrun

Xavier Debrun

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department

David Hauner

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - African Department

Manmohan Kumar

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department

Abstract

There has been a considerable literature regarding the incentives of policymakers as a prime reason for persistent fiscal deficits and a variety of fiscal rules have been proposed as a remedy. However, the often inadequate flexibility of rules and the success of policy delegation in the monetary realm have motivated a small but growing number of studies that suggest delegating some aspects of fiscal policy to what will here be called independent fiscal agencies. This paper surveys the related literature with a focus on three aspects: the motivation for the establishment of such agencies; their potential design; and the experience with these types of institutions.

Suggested Citation

Debrun, Xavier and Hauner, David and Kumar, Manmohan, Independent Fiscal Agencies. Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 23, Issue 1, pp. 44-81, February 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1327427 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6419.2008.00556.x

Xavier Debrun (Contact Author)

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department ( email )

700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
202-623-8321 (Phone)
202-623-6343 (Fax)

David Hauner

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - African Department ( email )

1700 19th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States

Manmohan Kumar

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department ( email )

700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
202-623-7771 (Phone)
202-589-7771 (Fax)

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