Congress, Corporate Boards, and Oversight: A Public Law/Private Law Comparison

42 Pages Posted: 26 Jan 2009 Last revised: 10 Oct 2019

See all articles by Paul S. Miller

Paul S. Miller

Loyola University School of Law

Date Written: January 13, 2009

Abstract

This article examines emerging ideas involving corporate governance and fiduciary duties and applies them to civic governance. Recent articles in corporate governance have applied behavioral economic research to suggest the emergence of an approach to corporate governance that seeks not so much to delineate where responsibility, and thereby legal liability, exists, but instead to develop mechanisms that make it easier for parties with disparate interests to trust one another. Such an approach would be a useful antidote to the current problems of civil government as well.

Keywords: corporate governance, fiduciary trust, behavioral economics, history

Suggested Citation

Miller, Paul Sanford, Congress, Corporate Boards, and Oversight: A Public Law/Private Law Comparison (January 13, 2009). University of Richmond Law Review, Vol. 44, p. 771, 2010, Loyola University New Orleans College of Law Research Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1327469 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1327469

Paul Sanford Miller (Contact Author)

Loyola University School of Law ( email )

7214 St. Charles Ave., Box 901
Campus Box 901
New Orleans, LA 70118
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
42
Abstract Views
579
PlumX Metrics