A Comparison of the Director Networks in the Main Companies Listed in Italy, France and the United Kingdom (Una comparazione tra le reti di amministratori nelle principali societa quotate in Italia, Francia e Gran Bretagna)
L'industria, Vol. 2/2008, 2008
Posted: 17 Jan 2009
Date Written: June 30, 2008
The purpose of the present paper is to contribute to the empirical literature on country interlocks by illustrating and analysing the interlocking directorships in the first 40 Italian, French and British Blue Chips as of December 2007 (Italy/March 2008 (France and UK). The theoretical literature identifies among the possible explanations for interlocking directorships the reduction of information asymmetries between debtors and their creditors and suppliers and the collusion among players in the same market. Our findings show two different national models, the British one and the French-Italian one. The first model is characterised by a limited number of companies linked with each other through just one director at the time; the second model by a higher number of companies that often share several directors at the time and seem to operate under mutual scrutiny.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Interlocking directorships, Antitrust, Competition, Social Network Analysis (SNA), Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA), Empirical Corporate Finance
JEL Classification: C00, L10, L40, G30, M20
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation