Factions with Clout: Presidential Cabinet Coalition and Policy in the Uruguayan Parliament

26 Pages Posted: 16 Jan 2009 Last revised: 21 Apr 2009

See all articles by Eric Magar

Eric Magar

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Political Science Department

Juan Andrés Moraes

Universidad de la Republica

Date Written: January 15, 2009

Abstract

We investigate bill passage between party factions in Uruguay and show they earn policy influence by joining coalition cabinets. The policy advantage of coalition is therefore not collected by the president alone, partners acquire clout in lawmaking. A faction should push legislation alone only if in a majority cabinet or else trade votes, preferably among those with resources to secure passage. Analysis of all bills initiated between 1985 and 2005 reveals that the odds of passing a bill sponsored alone by a majority cabinet faction was between (.4, .6), up from (.1, .2) otherwise. And contingent upon the cabinet status of factions involved, the odds of co-sponsored bills conform well to patterns expected by a view that policy rewards are a fundamental part of the politics of coalition in presidentialism.

Keywords: coalition cabinet, presidential democracy, party factions, Uruguay

JEL Classification: D71, D72, L14

Suggested Citation

Magar, Eric and Moraes, Juan Andrés, Factions with Clout: Presidential Cabinet Coalition and Policy in the Uruguayan Parliament (January 15, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1328668 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1328668

Eric Magar (Contact Author)

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Political Science Department ( email )

Rio Hondo 1
Col. Tizapan San-Angel
Mexico City, D.F. 01000
Mexico
525556284079 (Phone)
525554904674 (Fax)

Juan Andrés Moraes

Universidad de la Republica ( email )

Constituyente 1502
Montevideo, 11200
Uruguay

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