Factions with Clout: Presidential Cabinet Coalition and Policy in the Uruguayan Parliament
26 Pages Posted: 16 Jan 2009 Last revised: 21 Apr 2009
Date Written: January 15, 2009
We investigate bill passage between party factions in Uruguay and show they earn policy influence by joining coalition cabinets. The policy advantage of coalition is therefore not collected by the president alone, partners acquire clout in lawmaking. A faction should push legislation alone only if in a majority cabinet or else trade votes, preferably among those with resources to secure passage. Analysis of all bills initiated between 1985 and 2005 reveals that the odds of passing a bill sponsored alone by a majority cabinet faction was between (.4, .6), up from (.1, .2) otherwise. And contingent upon the cabinet status of factions involved, the odds of co-sponsored bills conform well to patterns expected by a view that policy rewards are a fundamental part of the politics of coalition in presidentialism.
Keywords: coalition cabinet, presidential democracy, party factions, Uruguay
JEL Classification: D71, D72, L14
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation