Sweetening the Lemon: House Prices and Adverse Selection in Secondary Loan Markets

39 Pages Posted: 17 Jan 2009 Last revised: 12 Feb 2009

Date Written: January 16, 2009

Abstract

This paper builds a simple model to look at the effect of securitisation on the banking system. In this paper we build a model of asymmetric information in the secondary market for loans and a 'lemons' problem faced by uninformed agents who buy these loans.

We show how certain conditions can sustain a secondary loan market even when banks have inside information about their borrowers, but only when other investment opportunities are good. Although the secondary loan market delivers welfare increases it is also unstable. We show how the emergence of secondary markets can lead not only to a fundamental increase in asset prices but also to a change in return correlations from negative to positive across asset classes.

Keywords: banks, asymmetric information, loan markets, mortgages, credit risk transfer

JEL Classification: G21, D53, D82

Suggested Citation

Sowerbutts, Rhiannon, Sweetening the Lemon: House Prices and Adverse Selection in Secondary Loan Markets (January 16, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1328953 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1328953

Rhiannon Sowerbutts (Contact Author)

Bank of England ( email )

Threadneedle Street
London, EC2R 8AH
United Kingdom

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
114
Abstract Views
679
rank
239,049
PlumX Metrics