Behavior Phase Diagram of the Prisoners' Dilemma
8 Pages Posted: 22 Jan 2009
Date Written: January 18, 2009
We conducted a series of experiments in which subjects played a repeated prisoners' dilemma game with different probabilities of continuation. We found that the relationship between the probability of continuation and the quantile regression slope (showing the final payoff and the percentage of cooperation being used as a strategy) is that as the probability increases, the value of quantile regression slope increases also and vice versa. Even more, the theory that, with a given population size, there exists a certain value of probability of continuation, upon which a cooperation equilibrium will be reliably produced (Kandori 1992), was accurately supported by the data from our experiments.
Keywords: Cooperation, Marching, Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, Experimental Design
JEL Classification: C71, C73, C91, C92
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