Behavior Phase Diagram of the Prisoners' Dilemma

8 Pages Posted: 22 Jan 2009

See all articles by Bin Xu

Bin Xu

Zhejiang Gongshang University (ZJGSU) - School of Public Administration

Date Written: January 18, 2009

Abstract

We conducted a series of experiments in which subjects played a repeated prisoners' dilemma game with different probabilities of continuation. We found that the relationship between the probability of continuation and the quantile regression slope (showing the final payoff and the percentage of cooperation being used as a strategy) is that as the probability increases, the value of quantile regression slope increases also and vice versa. Even more, the theory that, with a given population size, there exists a certain value of probability of continuation, upon which a cooperation equilibrium will be reliably produced (Kandori 1992), was accurately supported by the data from our experiments.

Keywords: Cooperation, Marching, Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, Experimental Design

JEL Classification: C71, C73, C91, C92

Suggested Citation

Xu, Bin, Behavior Phase Diagram of the Prisoners' Dilemma (January 18, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1329844 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1329844

Bin Xu (Contact Author)

Zhejiang Gongshang University (ZJGSU) - School of Public Administration ( email )

Hangzhou, Zhejiang 310018
China

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