Statement by European Academics on the Inappropriateness of Imposing Increased Internet Regulation in the EU

3 Pages Posted: 19 Jan 2009

See all articles by Martin E. Cave

Martin E. Cave

University of Warwick - Warwick Business School; Brunel University London

N.A.N.M. van Eijk

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Luigi Prosperetti

Law School - University of Milan

Richard Collins

The Open University

Alexandre de Streel

University of Namur

Pierre Larouche

Université de Montréal; Center on Regulation in Europe (CERRE)

Tommaso M. Valletti

Imperial College Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: January 8, 2009

Abstract

The European institutions are currently debating the desirability of imposing restrictions on the way in which internet service providers (ISPs) in the EU can manage their networks and develop their offerings, under the broad heading of 'network neutrality'.

In our opinion, so far, the need for new legislation on network neutrality in Europe is unproven, and the unintended consequences on restricting variety, competition and innovation are too big for comfort. We believe that some of the amendments put forward by the EP and Council are premature and will prove detrimental to long term end user interests in the EU, and urge that they be not adopted. The only reasonable course for the time being is to strengthen transparency towards end-users and for the rest rely on existing legislation.

Suggested Citation

Cave, Martin E. and van Eijk, N.A.N.M. and Prosperetti, Luigi and Collins, Richard and de Streel, Alexandre and Larouche, Pierre and Valletti, Tommaso M., Statement by European Academics on the Inappropriateness of Imposing Increased Internet Regulation in the EU (January 8, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1329926 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1329926

Martin E. Cave

University of Warwick - Warwick Business School ( email )

Centre for Management under Regulation (CMuR)
Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom

Brunel University London

Kingston Lane
Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH
United Kingdom

N.A.N.M. Van Eijk

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Luigi Prosperetti

Law School - University of Milan ( email )

Via Festa del Perdono, 7
Milan, 20122
Italy

Richard Collins

The Open University ( email )

Walton Hall
Milton Keynes, MK6 7AA
United Kingdom
00441908652231 (Phone)

Alexandre De Streel

University of Namur ( email )

8 rempart de la vierge
Namur, 5000
Belgium

Pierre Larouche (Contact Author)

Université de Montréal ( email )

Montreal, Quebec H3T 1B9
Canada

Center on Regulation in Europe (CERRE) ( email )

Rue de l'Industrie 42
Brussels, 1040
Belgium

Tommaso M. Valletti

Imperial College Business School ( email )

South Kensington Campus
Exhibition Road
London SW7 2AZ, SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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