Vote-Buying and Reciprocity
25 Pages Posted: 22 Jan 2009 Last revised: 3 Sep 2011
There are 3 versions of this paper
Vote-Buying and Reciprocity
Date Written: September 1, 2011
Abstract
While vote-buying is common, little is known about how politicians determine who to target. We argue that vote-buying can be sustained by an internalized norm of reciprocity. Receiving money engenders feelings of obligation. Combining survey data on vote-buying with an experiment-based measure of reciprocity, we show that politicians target reciprocal individuals. Overall, our ndings highlight the importance of social preferences in determining political behavior.
Keywords: vote-buying, reciprocity, paraguay, experiment, social preference, elections, corruption
JEL Classification: C93, D64, D72, K42, O17
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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