Sloan School of Management and Department of Economics
Date Written: April 6, 2006
The "parallel behavior is enough" standard cannot assist the courts in distinguishing horizontal agreements to restrain trade from normal competition. It would very likely impose significant costs on the economy by distorting competitive incentives and encouraging meritless litigation designed mainly to induce financial settlements.
Keywords: Twombly, Bell Atlantic, Bell Atlantic v Twombly, Amici Curiae, Sherman Section 1
Baumol, William J. and Boskin, Michael J. and Crandall, Robert and Elzinga, Kenneth G. and Evans, David S. and Evans, David S. and Faulhaber, Gerald R. and Fisher, Franklin M. and Froeb, Luke M. and Gilbert, Richard J. and Joskow, Paul L. and Katz, Michael L. and Milgrom, Paul R. and Moore, Thomas G. and Ordover, Janusz A. and Porter, Robert H. and Scherer, Frederic M. and Schmalensee, Richard and Schwartz, Marius and Sibley, David S. and Smith, Vernon L. and Snyder, Edward (Ted) A. and Spence, A. Michael and Spiller, Pablo T. and Sykes, Alan and Teece, David J. and Whinston, Michael D., Brief of Amici Curiae Economists in Support of Petitioners, Bell Atlantic V. Twombly (April 6, 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1330591 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1330591
Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper Series
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