Legal Reform and Administrative Detention Powers in China

U of Melbourne Legal Studies Research Paper No. 364

Sarah Biddulph, LEGAL REFORM AND ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION POWERS IN CHINA, Cambridge University Press, 2007

11 Pages Posted: 21 Jan 2009

See all articles by Sarah Biddulph

Sarah Biddulph

University of Melbourne - Law School

Date Written: January 20, 2009

Abstract

This book examines legal reform in China. Drawing on Bourdieu's concept of the 'field', the increasingly complex and contested processes of legal reform are analysed in relation to police powers. The impact of China's post-1978 legal reforms on police powers is examined through a detailed analysis of three administrative detention powers: detention for education of prostitutes; coercive drug rehabilitation; and re-education through labour. The debate surrounding the abolition in 1996 of detention for investigation (also known as shelter and investigation) is also considered. Despite over 20 years of legal reform, police powers remain poorly defined by law and subject to minimal legal constraint. They continue to be seriously and systematically abused. However, there has been both systematic and occasionally dramatic reform of these powers. This book considers the processes which have made these legal changes possible.

Keywords: legal reform, China, Bourdieu's concept, police powers, dentention powers

JEL Classification: K00,K3,K33,K4,K42

Suggested Citation

Biddulph, Sarah, Legal Reform and Administrative Detention Powers in China (January 20, 2009). U of Melbourne Legal Studies Research Paper No. 364; Sarah Biddulph, LEGAL REFORM AND ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION POWERS IN CHINA, Cambridge University Press, 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1330637

Sarah Biddulph (Contact Author)

University of Melbourne - Law School ( email )

University Square
185 Pelham Street, Carlton
Victoria, Victoria 3010
Australia

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
123
Abstract Views
659
rank
227,653
PlumX Metrics