Partial Compliance with Economic Sanctions

9 Pages Posted: 20 Jan 2009

See all articles by Hamid Beladi

Hamid Beladi

University of Texas at San Antonio - College of Business - Department of Economics

Reza Oladi

Utah State University - College of Business - Department of Economics

Abstract

By bridging the gap between the strategic model of sanctions and the public choice framework of sanctions, the authors introduce a new sanctions game. Contrary to an earlier finding, they show that the partial compliance of the target country, along with mild sanctions, are not only an equilibrium outcome, but also Pareto superior to non-compliance and tough economic sanctions.

Suggested Citation

Beladi, Hamid and Oladi, Reza, Partial Compliance with Economic Sanctions. Review of Development Economics, Vol. 13, Issue 1, pp. 125-133, February 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1330651 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9361.2008.00454.x

Hamid Beladi (Contact Author)

University of Texas at San Antonio - College of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

One UTSA Circle
P.O. Box 5636
San Antonio, TX 78249
United States
210-458-7038 (Phone)
210-458-7040 (Fax)

Reza Oladi

Utah State University - College of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

3530 Old Main Hill
Logan, UT 84322-3530
United States

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