9 Pages Posted: 20 Jan 2009
By bridging the gap between the strategic model of sanctions and the public choice framework of sanctions, the authors introduce a new sanctions game. Contrary to an earlier finding, they show that the partial compliance of the target country, along with mild sanctions, are not only an equilibrium outcome, but also Pareto superior to non-compliance and tough economic sanctions.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Beladi, Hamid and Oladi, Reza, Partial Compliance with Economic Sanctions. Review of Development Economics, Vol. 13, Issue 1, pp. 125-133, February 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1330651 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9361.2008.00454.x
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