Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labor Markets

39 Pages Posted: 19 Jan 1999 Last revised: 10 May 2000

See all articles by Daron Acemoglu

Daron Acemoglu

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Jörn-Steffen Pischke

London School of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 1998

Abstract

In this paper, we survey non-competitive theories of training. With competitive labor markets, firms never pay for investments in general training, whereas when labor markets are imperfect, firm-sponsored training arises as an equilibrium phenomenon. We discuss a variety of evidence which support the predictions of non-competitive theories, and we draw some tentative policy conclusions from these models.

Suggested Citation

Acemoglu, Daron and Pischke, Jörn-Steffen (Steve), Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labor Markets (September 1998). NBER Working Paper No. w6740. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=133068

Daron Acemoglu (Contact Author)

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Jörn-Steffen (Steve) Pischke

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