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Electoral Control when Policies are for Sale

27 Pages Posted: 21 Jan 2009  

Etienne Farvaque

University of Lille I - Department of Economics and Management; Lille Economie & Management (LEM) UMR 9221

Gael Lagadec

University of New Caledonia

Date Written: January 2009

Abstract

This article analyses the dynamics of electoral promises, building on an electoral competition model with endogenous policies. It extends the Grossman-Helpman (1994) model (Grossman G., Helpman E. (1994), "Protection for sale", American Economic Review, 84, 4, 833-850) to include sanctions from the electorate and lobbies when the incumbent does not satisfy the expected performance she promised to deliver. This framework allows to deal with the intertemporal dimension needed to understand the prevalent cycle of promises, disappointment, new promises, new disappointment.

Keywords: lobbies, promises, elections, electoral competition, lies

JEL Classification: D72, P16

Suggested Citation

Farvaque, Etienne and Lagadec, Gael, Electoral Control when Policies are for Sale (January 2009). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2522. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1330811

Etienne Farvaque

University of Lille I - Department of Economics and Management ( email )

Villeneuve D'Ascq Cedex, 59655
France

Lille Economie & Management (LEM) UMR 9221 ( email )

Lille
France

Gael Lagadec (Contact Author)

University of New Caledonia ( email )

Department of Economics
BPR4 - 98851 Nouméa Cedex
New Caledonia

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