RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW, K. Ayotte & H. E. Smith, eds., Edward Elgar, 2009
23 Pages Posted: 23 Jan 2009 Last revised: 14 Jul 2010
Date Written: January 21, 2009
Economic analysis of nuisance law can be divided into two branches: the transaction cost model and the externality model. The two models provide a relatively complete positive theory of nuisance law. Under the externality model, nuisance law optimally regulates activity levels. Nuisance law induces actors to choose socially optimal activity levels by imposing liability when externalized costs are far in excess of externalized benefits or not reciprocal to other background external costs. Proximate cause doctrine plays an important role in inducing optimal activity levels.
Keywords: Nuisance Law, transaction cost model, externality model, proximate cause doctrine, socially optimal activity levels
JEL Classification: K00, K13, K32
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Hylton, Keith N., The Economics of Nuisance Law (January 21, 2009). RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW, K. Ayotte & H. E. Smith, eds., Edward Elgar, 2009; Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 09-05. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1331071