Non-Competition Agreements and Research Productivity in the Biotechnology Industry

Babson College Entrepreneurship Research Conference (BCERC) 2006

Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research 2006

10 Pages Posted: 11 Feb 2009 Last revised: 25 Nov 2014

See all articles by Joseph E. Coombs

Joseph E. Coombs

University of Richmond - E. Claiborne Robins School of Business

Porcher Taylor

University of Richmond - E. Claiborne Robins School of Business

Date Written: January 21, 2009

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of the state-level legal structure, namely the legal support for non-competition agreements, on research productivity. Specifically, we study how California's unique lack of non-competition agreement laws influences product develop when controlling for local munificence and firm-level technological capability. Our results indicate that California's unique legal structure is negatively associated with research productivity as measured by the number of products in development at the time a biotechnology firm goes public. Further, firm size moderates this relationship such that the effect is stronger for smaller biotechnology firms.

Keywords: Entrepreneurship

JEL Classification: M13

Suggested Citation

Coombs, Joseph E. and Taylor, Porcher, Non-Competition Agreements and Research Productivity in the Biotechnology Industry (January 21, 2009). Babson College Entrepreneurship Research Conference (BCERC) 2006; Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research 2006. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1331083 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1331083

Joseph E. Coombs (Contact Author)

University of Richmond - E. Claiborne Robins School of Business ( email )

Richmond, VA 23173
United States

Porcher Taylor

University of Richmond - E. Claiborne Robins School of Business ( email )

Richmond, VA 23173
United States

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