Democracy, Sovereignty and Tax Competition: The Role of Tax Sovereignty in Shaping Tax Cooperation

42 Pages Posted: 29 Jan 2009 Last revised: 15 Jul 2010

Diane M. Ring

Boston College - Law School

Date Written: January 28, 2009

Abstract

This paper considers the question of how sovereignty shapes arguments over the merits of tax competition and how sovereignty influences the design of responses to tax competition. Part I provides a basic overview of sovereignty concepts, in particular their relevance to a nation-state desirous of control over tax policy. Part II defines tax competition, identifies the different kinds of states involved, reviews the emergence of the OECD project to limit harmful tax competition, and traces the EU experience with tax competition. Part III explores the normative grounds for challenging tax competition and the role of sovereignty in shaping and limiting these challenges. Finally, Part IV, working from the practical and theoretical baselines established in Part III, considers how an appreciation of sovereignty claims can facilitate the design of plausible cooperation strategies for states trying to limit tax competition.

Keywords: tax competition, tax rules, taxation, tax policy

Suggested Citation

Ring, Diane M., Democracy, Sovereignty and Tax Competition: The Role of Tax Sovereignty in Shaping Tax Cooperation (January 28, 2009). Florida Tax Review, Vol. 9, p. 555, 2009; Boston College Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 171. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1334212

Diane M. Ring (Contact Author)

Boston College - Law School ( email )

885 Centre Street
Newton, MA 02459-1163
United States

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