The Decline of the DPA: What Has Happened and Why

Update: Food and Drug Law, Regulation, and Education, March/April 2009 at 50

Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-10

8 Pages Posted: 31 Jan 2009 Last revised: 31 Mar 2009

See all articles by Ralph Hall, JD

Ralph Hall, JD

University of Minnesota, Twin Cities - School of Law

Timothy W. Schmidt

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - School of Law; University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Minnesota Law Review

Date Written: January 23, 2009

Abstract

For the past several years, commentators have predicted (or warned) that federal prosecutors were increasingly using deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) and non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) when settling with companies accused of corporate wrongdoing. From 2002 (the year after Enron) through 2007, this prediction was accurate - DPAs increased by from 2 in 2001 to 20 in 2007 and NPAs increased from 1 to 18 in the same time period. Something then happened in 2008. New research demonstrates that the use of these mechanisms has markedly decreased over the past year, and may continue to do so. This article is the first to describe this phenomenon, suggests some possible reasons and poses questions for future research and analysis.

Suggested Citation

Hall, JD, Ralph and Schmidt, Timothy W., The Decline of the DPA: What Has Happened and Why (January 23, 2009). Update: Food and Drug Law, Regulation, and Education, March/April 2009 at 50, Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-10, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1335531

Ralph Hall, JD

University of Minnesota, Twin Cities - School of Law ( email )

229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

Timothy W. Schmidt (Contact Author)

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - School of Law ( email )

229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Minnesota Law Review ( email )

229 19th Ave. South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

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