Daubert and Other Gatekeeping Challenges of Antitrust Economists

AAI Working Paper #08-06

29 Pages Posted: 4 Feb 2009 Last revised: 3 Mar 2010

James Langenfeld

Loyola University Chicago School of Law; Navigant Consulting, Inc.

Chris Alexander

Navigant Consulting, Inc.

Date Written: March 1, 2010

Abstract

This paper examines the affect of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms and related gatekeeping decisions on expert testimony since January 2000, focusing primarily on economic testimony in antitrust cases. An analysis of gatekeeping motions on economic testimony taken from two data sets that attempt to track these motions suggests that the courts’ gatekeeping may have created additional barriers to plaintiff antitrust cases, and so may discourage well-qualified economists from taking these cases. These data show that economists appear to be most frequently challenged when providing economic opinions on behalf of the plaintiff in antitrust cases, while defense experts are often unchallenged. Moreover, plaintiff exclusions are much higher than defense expert exclusions. These results suggest further research should be done to test the reliability of the data, determine the causes of the apparent imbalance, and see what actions -- if any -- should be taken to address any imbalance.

Keywords: Daubert, Antitrust, Expert Witnesses, Gatekeeping

Suggested Citation

Langenfeld, James and Alexander, Chris, Daubert and Other Gatekeeping Challenges of Antitrust Economists (March 1, 2010). AAI Working Paper #08-06. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1337081 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1337081

James Langenfeld (Contact Author)

Loyola University Chicago School of Law

25 E. Pearson
Chicago, IL 60611
United States

Navigant Consulting, Inc.

30 South Wacker Drive
Chicago, IL 60606
United States

Chris Alexander

Navigant Consulting, Inc.

30 South Wacker Drive
Chicago, IL 60606
United States

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