Too-Big-To-Fail, Government Bailouts, and Managerial Incentives: The Case of Reconstruction Finance Corporation Assistance to the Railroad Industry During the Great Depression

39 Pages Posted: 4 Feb 2009

See all articles by Joseph R. Mason

Joseph R. Mason

Louisiana State University - Ourso School of Business; University of Pennsylvania - Wharton Financial Institutions Center

Daniel Schiffman

Ariel University - Department of Economics and Business Administration

Date Written: October 15, 2002

Abstract

Transportation infrastructure has long been thought to be important to economic growth and development. Hence, financial difficulties in the transportation industry have often been considered too-big-to-fail and, as a result, elicited government assistance. Turnpikes, canals, railroads, and airlines have all received government assistance through US history. However, it is unclear whether such assistance helps the target companies recover or just postpones their inevitable demise. The normative public policy bias toward transportation infrastructure seems to be "better too much of a public good (and hence assistance toward that public good) than too little." However, while that normative bias may at first glance appear reasonable, assistance has long been suspected of skewing investment incentives away from those that would obtain in the absence of that assistance.

Keywords: Reconstruction Finance Corporation, RFC, Banking, Railroads, Public Policy

JEL Classification: G21, G28, G34

Suggested Citation

Mason, Joseph R. and Schiffman, Daniel, Too-Big-To-Fail, Government Bailouts, and Managerial Incentives: The Case of Reconstruction Finance Corporation Assistance to the Railroad Industry During the Great Depression (October 15, 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1337203 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1337203

Joseph R. Mason (Contact Author)

Louisiana State University - Ourso School of Business

2900 Business Education Complex
Baton Rouge, LA 70803
United States
202-683-8909 (Phone)

University of Pennsylvania - Wharton Financial Institutions Center ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6218
United States

Daniel Schiffman

Ariel University - Department of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Israel

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