How Much of the Diversification Discount Can be Explained by Poor Corporate Governance?

52 Pages Posted: 11 Feb 2009 Last revised: 15 Jun 2013

See all articles by Daniel Hoechle

Daniel Hoechle

FHNW School of Business - Institute for Finance; University of Basel - Department of Finance

Markus Schmid

University of St. Gallen - Swiss Institute of Banking and Finance; University of St. Gallen - School of Finance

Ingo Walter

New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business; New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance

David Yermack

New York University (NYU) - Stern School of Business

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 15, 2011

Abstract

We investigate whether the diversification discount occurs partly as an artifact of poor corporate governance. In panel data models, we find that the discount narrows by 16% to 21% when we add governance variables as regression controls. We also estimate Heckman selection models that account for the endogeneity of diversification and dynamic panel generalized method of moments models that account for the endogeneity of both diversification and governance. We find that the diversification discount persists even with these controls for endogeneity. However, in selection models the discount disappears entirely when we introduce governance variables in the second stage, and in dynamic panel GMM models the discount narrows by 37% when we include governance variables.

Keywords: Organizational structure, Diversification, Firm valuation, Corporate governance

JEL Classification: G32, G34

Suggested Citation

Hoechle, Daniel and Schmid, Markus and Walter, Ingo and Yermack, David, How Much of the Diversification Discount Can be Explained by Poor Corporate Governance? (July 15, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1341006 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1341006

Daniel Hoechle

FHNW School of Business - Institute for Finance ( email )

Peter Merian-Strasse 86
Basel, CH-4002
Switzerland
+41 61 279 17 73 (Phone)

University of Basel - Department of Finance ( email )

Peter Merian-Weg 6
Basel, CH-4002
Switzerland

Markus Schmid (Contact Author)

University of St. Gallen - Swiss Institute of Banking and Finance ( email )

Rosenbergstrasse 52
St. Gallen, 9000
Switzerland

University of St. Gallen - School of Finance ( email )

Unterer Graben 21
St.Gallen, CH-9000
Switzerland

Ingo Walter

New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012
United States
212-998-0707 (Phone)
212-995-4220 (Fax)

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance

Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States

David Yermack

New York University (NYU) - Stern School of Business ( email )

44 West 4th Street
Suite 9-160
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States
212-998-0357 (Phone)
212-995-4220 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~dyermack

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