The Design of Vertical R&D Collaborations
39 Pages Posted: 12 Feb 2009 Last revised: 7 May 2013
There are 2 versions of this paper
The Design of Vertical R&D Collaborations
The Design of Vertical R&D Collaborations
Date Written: May 7, 2013
Abstract
Suppliers play a major role in downstream firms' innovation processes. We analyze ownership allocations and the choice of technology in vertical research and development (R&D) cooperations. Given that R&D outcomes are not contractible, there is a trade-off between R&D specifically designed towards a manufacturer (increasing investment productivity) and a general technology (hold-up reduction). We find that in too few cases the market solution yields the specific technology. More intense product market competition shifts optimal ownership towards the supplier. The use of exit clauses increases the gains from the collaboration.
Keywords: Managing innovations, vertical R&D collaboration, choice of technology
JEL Classification: L22, L24, O31, O32
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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