Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 189-199, September 2009
13 Pages Posted: 13 Feb 2009 Last revised: 2 Dec 2009
Date Written: March 30, 2009
The paper shows that the effect of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) is ambiguous. It discusses the benefits and costs of mark-to-market valuation and design of executive pay package policies within the US 2009 EESA. It highlights how mark-to-market valuation standard influenced financial institutions, explains why mark-to-market policy suspension proponents can support EESA, and realizes how FASB and SEC can count on EESA while assessing the need and cost of mark-to-market policy. Also, the paper discusses the promise of executive wage caps within EESA. Moreover, it differentiates between executive pay packages pre and post EESA policies.
Keywords: Corporate governance, financial crisis, bailout, EESA, mark-to-market valuation, and executive pay package caps
JEL Classification: G12, G23, J33, K23, M52
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Haidar, Jamal Ibrahim, The Mark-to-Market Valuation and Executive Pay Package Regulations within the 2009 US (Bailout) Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (March 30, 2009). Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 189-199, September 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1341908