Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

The Mark-to-Market Valuation and Executive Pay Package Regulations within the 2009 US (Bailout) Emergency Economic Stabilization Act

Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 189-199, September 2009

13 Pages Posted: 13 Feb 2009 Last revised: 2 Dec 2009

Jamal Ibrahim Haidar

Harvard University

Date Written: March 30, 2009

Abstract

The paper shows that the effect of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) is ambiguous. It discusses the benefits and costs of mark-to-market valuation and design of executive pay package policies within the US 2009 EESA. It highlights how mark-to-market valuation standard influenced financial institutions, explains why mark-to-market policy suspension proponents can support EESA, and realizes how FASB and SEC can count on EESA while assessing the need and cost of mark-to-market policy. Also, the paper discusses the promise of executive wage caps within EESA. Moreover, it differentiates between executive pay packages pre and post EESA policies.

Keywords: Corporate governance, financial crisis, bailout, EESA, mark-to-market valuation, and executive pay package caps

JEL Classification: G12, G23, J33, K23, M52

Suggested Citation

Haidar, Jamal Ibrahim, The Mark-to-Market Valuation and Executive Pay Package Regulations within the 2009 US (Bailout) Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (March 30, 2009). Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 189-199, September 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1341908

Jamal Ibrahim Haidar (Contact Author)

Harvard University ( email )

1875 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

HOME PAGE: http://scholar.harvard.edu/haidar

Paper statistics

Downloads
290
Rank
87,027
Abstract Views
1,588