What Drives the Passage of Damage Caps?

EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF JUDICIAL SYSTEMS AROUND THE GLOBE, Institutum Jurisprudentiae, Academia Sinica, 2009

NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 09-08

U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 09-09

20 Pages Posted: 14 Feb 2009 Last revised: 22 Apr 2012

Jonathan Klick

University of Pennsylvania Law School; Erasmus School of Law; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center

Catherine M. Sharkey

New York University School of Law

Date Written: February 13, 2009

Abstract

A number of states have passed caps on non-economic and punitive damage awards in civil cases. The conventional wisdom is that the passage of these caps is driven by "out-of-control" jury awards that need to be reigned in. However, it could be the case that voters harboring anti-litigation, pro-tort reform sentiments are more likely to support the passage of caps even in the absence of an upsurge in awards. To examine the effect of jury awards on the passage of caps, we estimate semi-parametric hazard models of cap passage using data from the Jury Verdict Research Reporter.

Keywords: punitive damages, caps, damage caps, jury awards

JEL Classification: C14, C41, K13, K41

Suggested Citation

Klick, Jonathan and Sharkey, Catherine M., What Drives the Passage of Damage Caps? (February 13, 2009). EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF JUDICIAL SYSTEMS AROUND THE GLOBE, Institutum Jurisprudentiae, Academia Sinica, 2009; NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 09-08; U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 09-09. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1342535

Jonathan Klick

University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )

3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
2157463455 (Phone)

Erasmus School of Law ( email )

3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

PERC - Property and Environment Research Center

2048 Analysis Drive
Suite A
Bozeman, MT 59718
United States

Catherine M. Sharkey (Contact Author)

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-998-6729 (Phone)

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