Contracting Frictions and Cross-Border Capital Flows: Evidence from Venture Capital

36 Pages Posted: 19 Feb 2009  

Laura Anne Lindsey

Arizona State University (ASU) - Finance Department

Ana Laura Balcarcel

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Michael G. Hertzel

Arizona State University (ASU) - Finance Department

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 2008

Abstract

Analyzing a large sample of cross-border investments by U.S. venture capital firms, we find that average round sizes and the fraction of financing raised in the first round are larger for companies in countries with poorer legal enforcement. This evidence, which is consistent with third-best contracting where investors take larger stakes to mitigate contractual enforcement problems, suggests that the staging of investments in weak enforcement countries may be less than an optimal. We develop a contracting friction measure, based on the degree of sub-optimal staging, and find that it is negatively related to aggregate cross-border venture capital flows. We interpret the evidence as consistent with a "staging channel" through which frictions that lead to third-best contracting and sub-optimal staging limit cross-border investment.

Keywords: Venture capital, cross-border, contracting

Suggested Citation

Lindsey, Laura Anne and Balcarcel, Ana Laura and Hertzel, Michael G., Contracting Frictions and Cross-Border Capital Flows: Evidence from Venture Capital (November 2008). EFA 2009 Bergen Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1342775 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1342775

Laura Anne Lindsey

Arizona State University (ASU) - Finance Department ( email )

W. P. Carey School of Business
PO Box 873906
Tempe, AZ 85287-3906
United States

Ana Laura Balcarcel

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Michael G. Hertzel (Contact Author)

Arizona State University (ASU) - Finance Department ( email )

W. P. Carey School of Business
P.O. Box 873906
Tempe, AZ 85287-3906
United States
480-965-6869 (Phone)
602-965-8539 (Fax)

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