Why Different Jurisdictions Do Not (and Should Not) Adopt the Same Antitrust Rules

23 Pages Posted: 13 Feb 2009 Last revised: 28 Jul 2022

See all articles by David S. Evans

David S. Evans

Global Economics Group; Market Platform Dynamics

Date Written: February 16, 2009

Abstract

This article summarizes the theory on the optimal design of antitrust rules and discusses the application of such theory in different jurisdictional settings. It establishes the proposition that divergence is the norm for antitrust rules. This paper argues that the quest for convergence is quixotic and the disdain when another jurisdiction has a different rule than one's own is uncalled for. Along the way it considers two beacons of divergence that appeared on either side of the Atlantic at the end of 2008 - the US Department of Justice's report on unilateral conduct and the European Commission's enforcement guidelines on abusive exclusionary conduct.

Keywords: antitrust and error costs, optimal antitrust policy, design of antitrust policy, differences in antitrust across countries, antitrust and false positives, antitrust rules

JEL Classification: K21, L40, N40

Suggested Citation

Evans, David S., Why Different Jurisdictions Do Not (and Should Not) Adopt the Same Antitrust Rules (February 16, 2009). Chicago Journal of International Law, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1342797

David S. Evans (Contact Author)

Global Economics Group ( email )

One Beacon St
Boston, MA 02108
United States

HOME PAGE: http://davidsevans.org

Market Platform Dynamics ( email )

140 South Dearborn St.
Chicago, IL 60603
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
721
Abstract Views
3,679
rank
52,837
PlumX Metrics