Why Different Jurisdictions Do Not (and Should Not) Adopt the Same Antitrust Rules

23 Pages Posted: 13 Feb 2009  

David S. Evans

Global Economics Group; University College London

Date Written: February 16, 2009

Abstract

This article summarizes the theory on the optimal design of antitrust rules and discusses the application of such theory in different jurisdictional settings. It establishes the proposition that divergence is the norm for antitrust rules. This paper argues that the quest for convergence is quixotic and the disdain when another jurisdiction has a different rule than one's own is uncalled for. Along the way it considers two beacons of divergence that appeared on either side of the Atlantic at the end of 2008 - the US Department of Justice's report on unilateral conduct and the European Commission's enforcement guidelines on abusive exclusionary conduct.

JEL Classification: K21, L40, N40

Suggested Citation

Evans, David S., Why Different Jurisdictions Do Not (and Should Not) Adopt the Same Antitrust Rules (February 16, 2009). Chicago Journal of International Law, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1342797

David S. Evans (Contact Author)

Global Economics Group ( email )

111 Devonshire St.
Suite 900
Boston, MA 02108
United States

University College London ( email )

Gower St
London WC1E OEG, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

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