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Managerial Entrenchment and the Market for Talent

31 Pages Posted: 14 Feb 2009 Last revised: 6 Jun 2016

Fabio Feriozzi

IE Business School - IE University

Date Written: June 4, 2016


This paper studies how the generality of managerial skills affects firms' governance decisions. As managerial skills become less firm-specific and more portable across firms, the market for talent offers better opportunities for replacing an incumbent chief executive officer (CEO) with an external hire. This results in higher pay in the market, but, overall, the profitability of an external appointment increases in large firms, where managerial talent is most productive. As a consequence, large firms limit the entrenchment of incumbent managers to take advantage of the improved replacement opportunities offered by the market. The analysis rationalizes the recent trend toward stronger corporate governance and offers novel empirical predictions concerning the relationship between managerial entrenchment, firm size and the generality of managerial skills.

Keywords: Managerial entrenchment, corporate governance, managerial labor market

JEL Classification: D83, D86, G34

Suggested Citation

Feriozzi, Fabio, Managerial Entrenchment and the Market for Talent (June 4, 2016). Available at SSRN: or

Fabio Feriozzi (Contact Author)

IE Business School - IE University ( email )

Finance Department
Maria de Molina, 12
Madrid, 28006

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